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ABSTRACT.   This article experimentally explores the way in which  human agents learn 
how  to  process  and  manage  new  information.  In  an  abstract  setting,  players  should 
perform an everyday task: selecting information, making generalizations, distinguishing 
contexts. The tendency to generalize is common to all participants, but in a different way. 
Best players have a stringer tendency to generalise rules. A high score is, in fact, associated 
with low entropy for mistakes, that is with a tendency to repeat the same mistakes over 
and  over.  Though  the  repetition  of  mistakes  might  be  considered  a  failure  to  properly 
employ feedback or a bias, it may instead turn out as a viable and successful procedure. 
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Sensorial perception, information processing, mental representation, and learning do not 
sound like the typical economics jargon. Microeconomic mainstream does not entertain 
with these concepts because its approach abstracts from real psychological properties and 
actual decision processes. According to the standard microeconomic approach, individual 
behaviour is rational – in a substantive sense – when it achieves the given goals of an 
agent within the exogenous limits of the choice environment. Individual preferences and 
meta-preferences,  for  instance  egoism  and  altruism,  are  external  to  this  approach  and 
must be posited a priori. In order to realise given (egoistic or altruistic) goals, an agent 
must possess complete knowledge of the choice environment and be capable of perfectly 
computing  all  this  information  in  an  optimal  fashion.  Both  conditions  are  hardly  ever 
realised and the capacity of microeconomic models to explain individual behaviour are 
very  scarce.  Within  the  ranks  of  economics,  however,  on  several  occasions  different 
scholars have called for an expansion of economic analysis to include more nuanced and 
plausible accounts of human agency.  
  For  instance,  Herbert  Simon  (1976),  suggested  a  concept  of  rationality  which  is 
bounded – i.e. with limited available information and limited capacity to process it – and 
which is based on procedures instead of substantive goals. His research, therefore, had a 
positive  focus  on  the  uncovering  of  actual  decision  processes,  but  inevitably  took  a 
normative lean in the definition of what are the best procedures available to real economic 
agents. Uncovering the way people think, decide, and learn affords a better understanding 
of  the  social  world,  but  it  also  empowers  the  development  of  better  choice  aids  and 
teaching methods. 
  This article falls within this approach, which may be called Cognitive Economics, 
and it experimentally explores the way in which the participants learn how to process and 
manage  new  information.  Our  experimental  setting  is  abstract  so  that  the  participants 
cannot rely on any knowledge they already have and must instead learn everything from 
scratch. In such an abstract setting, our players should perform an everyday task: selecting 
information,  making  generalizations,  distinguishing  contexts.  Can  they  learn  how  to 
consistently make the best choice in a new complex environment? 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In standard economics, the pressure of competition (Alchian 1950) ensures that agents 
who do not make the best choices are forced out of the market in a fashion akin to natural 
selection (Vromen 1995). Individual agents are therefore routinely modelled in such a way 
that  they  always  make  the  best  choices:  this  means  that  they  are  assumed  to  possess 3 
 
perfect  information  and  unlimited  computational  skills,  and  to  pursue  their  narrow 
material advantage. Although it is implausible that individuals are (or even can be) as 
microeconomic models represent them, it  may be  enough for economists to show that 
people become (or tend to become) such. Agents capable of improving their performance 
over time and of progressing towards ever more efficient decisions may uphold, and justify 
the  recourse  to,  the  assumption  of  perfect  individual  rationality.  This  requires  the 
modelling of some individual capacity to learn. 
  Some  examples  of  how  this  has  been  attempted  are  the  Bayesian  and  the  Least 
Square Learning (e.g. Marcet and Sargent 1989). Both describe the optimal processing of 
available empirical data by individual agents. These data are then employed in subsequent 
decision  making  in  a  way  that  approximates  the  assumption  of  complete  information. 
Though  also  the  assumption  of  perfect  processing  of  information  is  implausible,  even 
psychological models which assume an imperfect processing of the information suggest 
that people can learn how to make the best choices. Reinforcement Learning models (e.g. 
Erev  and  Roth  1998),  for  instance,  suggest  that  agents  repeat  choices  which  allowed 
positive results in the past and consequently adjust their behaviour to empirical evidence 
in a way that makes it increasingly likely to observe a repetition of the same behaviour 
(although a, smaller and smaller, probability of making a different choice remains). In 
standard and stable contexts, reinforcement learning easily results in consistently optimal 
behaviour just like microeconomic models require. 
  Learning,  however,  should  not  be  considered  as  a  black-box  mechanism  that 
prompts  automatic  choices,  but  rather  as  a  process  of  assigning  specific  meanings  to 
different states of the world. Brian Arthur (1992), for instance, observed learning cannot be 
reduced  to  the  acquisition  of  new  data,  but  it  requires  the  construction  of  semantic 
categories  that  categorise  the  data.  Moreover,  individuals  build  mental  models  that 
organise  large  chunks  of  empirical  evidence.  Starting  from  observation,  individuals 
generate  hypotheses  about  causality  and  develop  models  that  allow  prediction  and 
decision-making. These hypotheses and models are neither static nor unique. Choices are 
thus  repeatedly  tested  against  real  world  phenomena,  associated  with  their  observed 
outcome, and eventually reinforced or abandoned. The world presents traceable patterns 
and  Arthur  believes  that  the  skill  to  detect  these  patterns  is  both  a  necessary  and 
advantageous human cognitive skill. 
  Richard Nelson (2007) suggests that the search for better ways of doing something 
is  both  oriented  and  constrained  by  what  agents  currently  know.  Current  knowledge 
suggests some behaviour consistent with an agent‟s goal. The received feedback results 4 
 
either  in  a  more  efficient  behaviour  or  in  an  improved  understanding  of  the  specific 
decision-making  context.  The  agent  "either  needs  to  learn  how  to  identify  different 
contexts, as well as a set of context specific guides of action, or find a broad guide to action 
that  works  reasonably  well  in  all  or  most  contexts  he  will  face"  (Nelson  2007,  p.  6). 
Therefore, problem solving requires both trial-and-error learning and abstract theorizing. 
  The study of the capacity to manage information in a complex environment is also 
central  to  Ronald  Heiner‟s  (1983,  1985)  model  of  behavioural  entropy.  According  to 
Heiner, individuals more or less consciously make a choice between very few of the many 
different actions which are possible on each occasion. This subset consisting of „reliable‟ 
actions, or actions which typically afford satisfactory results, is a result of uncertainty – 
which can be defined as a lack of knowledge of (or lack of the skill to define) the link 
between contexts and optimal decisions. A reduction in the number of potential options 
may  be  a  consequence  of  reacting  only  to  some  information,  ignoring  the  rest,  of 
disregarding the distinction among certain pieces of information, or of individual failures 
in the processing of information, resulting in somewhat generic rules of behaviour that 
disregard some context-specific variables. 
  In  the  presence  of  uncertainty,  it  can  be  expected  that  agents  try  out  several 
alternative choices until they figure which ones are reliable. Therefore we observe high 
variability of behaviour and it is very hard to predict which option will an actor choose 
next. Over time, as agents learn to react to selected information, their behaviour should 
become less erratic and therefore more predictable. Heiner employs behavioural entropy 
as a measurement of the variability of behaviour. It can be computed as follows (see also 
the Appendix): 
 
   a a
B h h E log                   (1) 
 
where  a is  an element in the set of possible actions  A,  and  ha=p(a) is the probability 
(relative frequency) of choosing a given action. The higher the number of different actions 
attempted in the same choice-context and the more uniform their frequency (for instance 
when an agent gives random answers), the higher an agent‟s behavioural entropy is and 
the harder it is to predict this agent‟s choices. Conversely, if an agent‟s behaviour is stable 
(because he always makes the same choice), entropy is zero. 
  Though  he  does  not  directly  explores  learning,  from  Heiner‟s  reflections,  and 
consistently with Arthur‟s and Nelson‟s above, learning may be considered a capacity to 
discover ever better reliable actions, which means to better use information and to better 5 
 
interpret  decision  contexts.  This  immediately  translates  in  the  abandonment  of  any 
concept  of  perfect  rationality,  which  is  instead  replaced  by  a  definition  of  bounded 
rationality  (à  la  Simon,  1983)  as  the  capacity  to  manage  only  some  subsets  of  useful 
information. As people learn, they use larger and larger amounts of important information 
and they react in more specialised ways to subtle changes in environmental conditions. 
The  overall  variability  of  their  behaviour  therefore  scales  up,  while  its  predictability  is 
diminished. Within narrowly defined choice contexts, however, variability shrinks. 
  Since behaviour reflects individual cognitions, learning ultimately affects an agent‟s 
behaviour through a change in the type or in the amount of his processed information – 
e.g. concerning (un-)attainable or (un-)desirable outcomes; (un-)feasible, (in-)effective or 
(in-)efficient actions. In this sense, all learning modifies the knowledge agent possesses 
about the task he is facing (Novarese, 2012). The two main vehicles of learning (Bandura 
1977,  Rizzello  and  Turvani  2002,  Witt  2000)  are  vicarious  learning,  which  occurs  via 
observation or imitation of the behaviour of others, and direct learning, which takes place 
when actors obtain information from the outcome of their own actions. 
  This idea of learning can be understood looking at an experiment which analyses 
(direct)  learning  in  a  complex,  but  stable,  choice  environment  with  strong  monetary 
incentives and where full feedback is immediately available. 
 
THE EXPERIMENT 
The  experiment  took  place  at  the  Centre  for  Cognitive  Economics  at  the  University  of 
Eastern Piedmont in Alessandria (Italy) on the 5 July 2000. 
 
Participants and Experimental Design 
The participants were twenty-three undergraduate students of Law, enrolled in the first-
year optional Seminar of Economics. Each sat in a cubicle with a computer and was not 
allowed  to  take  notes  or  to  communicate  with  the  others.  After  reading  the  written 
instructions  (see  the  Appendix),  the  participants  started  the  experiment,  which  lasted 
about one hour. The students were compensated with 40 ITL (€ 0,02) per point scored in 
the present experiment. They were told that the participation would have no impact on 




The experiment was constructed around a fictional association, whose members fall within 6 
 
one  of  five  age  categories:  Children,  Adolescents,  Young,  Adults,  and  Elderly.  The 
information about members is reported on a set of cards located on either of two shelves 
(Right and Left). Each card presents two features: one of four animals (Cow, Horse, Goose, 
and Chicken) and one of four shapes (Square, Rectangle, Circle, and Oval)
2, as in FIG. 1. 
  On each turn the participants were presented with a sequence of animal, shape, and 
shelf,  and  were  asked  to  guess  the  corresponding  membership  category  within  ten 
seconds
3.  The  logical  relationship  between  the  card  features,  the  shelves,  and  the 
membership was based on a specified criterion (i.e. it was not random) and it remained 
constant throughout the 231 turns of the experiment, but it  was not related to any real 
world  fact  and  it  explicitly  did  not  require  any  academic  knowledge  ( TAB.  1).  The 
connection  could  and  should  be  learned  during  the  experiment  in  order  to  fulfil  the 
ultimate goal of scoring as many points as possible. 
 
Table 1 - Solution 
 

































(circle, oval)  Left  Elderly 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
1 The best performer thus earned € 25.52, the worst performer earned € 14.32. The average and median 
compensation were € 18.62 and € 18.08, respectively. 
2 The features needed be as neutral as possible. In a previous experiment (Novarese and Rizzello 2006), the 
employment of bright/dark colours and large/small sizes may explain why the subjects associ ated certain 
features with value judgements (i.e. insufficient to excellent). Here we also tested the features to ensure 
neutrality. 





At the end of each turn, subjects were given full feedback (FIG. 2). The score was calculated 
with respect to the distance between the answer given an the correct answer: the distance 
is 0 when the answer is correct and in this case the score is 6, the distance is 1 when the 
answer  given  is  one  membership  category  above  or  below  the  correct  answer  (e.g. 






Earlier  articles  that  investigated  experiments  such  as  the  present  one  (Novarese  and 
Rizzello 2007, Lanteri and Novarese 2007) reveal a clear result: memorization does not 
explain individual performance (nor did we expect this to be the case on the basis of our 
background literature). There are so many sequences, which change with such frequency, 
that memorization is not cognitively speaking an option for the participants. It is both 
more natural and more efficient to develop actual theories about the experimental world 
that result in the repetition of choices consistent with these theories, both when they are 
correct and when they are wrong (because the revision of some theory is time consuming). 
  Participants progress from random choices at the beginning towards more stable 
(and therefore predictable) ones, based on a limited number of elements of the sequence – 
i.e. only Animal and Shelf, disregarding Shape (see Lanteri and Novarese 2007) – and then 8 
 
on to a more complete and sophisticated representation of the experimental environment. 
The responses of each participant thus become ever more predictable, so that, given a 
sequence, we may forecast his responses with increasing accuracy. This is because, on the 
one hand, the number of correct answers increases, but so do the number of repeated 
mistakes. In the coming paragraphs we explain these trends. 
 
The development of theories 
When a participant gives several times the correct answer to a sequence, she must have 
understood the exact working of that portion of the experiment. If she often gives wrong 
answers, perhaps she has not yet uncovered the principle of that sequence. However, if the 
wrong answer is consistently the same, it is very likely that the participant has developed a 
mistaken theory. 
  In this section we study this phenomenon. Since it is possible that theories change 
over the experiment, as participants learn, we require that the repetitions occur at least for 
a period of time, and specifically for a third of the overall experiment, which gives us three 
phases: turns 1-77, 78-154, and 155-231. We only focus on the stable (which allows us to 
plausibly  assume  that  it  is  principled,  too)  association  of  an  answer  with  a  sequence, 
therefore  we  only  consider  responses  given  75%  of  the  times.  Any  answer  given  to  a 
sequence which only appears once would be given 100% of the times. This, however, does 
not seem enough to assume stability of behaviour. Instead, we require that a sequence has 
appeared at least four times during the experiment (but on average they appear ten times) 
and at least three times in each phase. 
  Participants indeed develop stable associations between sequences and responses, 
just like we expected. The number of theories that qualify for our analysis increases from 
130 in the first phase to 235 in the third and they also become increasingly accurate going 
from a 56% rate of correct answers in the first phase, up to 67% in the third. Although 
participants get better and better, the number of stably mistaken theories is astonishing: 
31% in the first phase and 42% in the third. Note that, though our condition was that 
answers  were  given  75%  of  the  time,  we  have  numerous  observations  with  a  100% 
frequency. But only 57% of these were correct, while 43% were wrong. 
  How can this happen? Don‟t participants see their answers are wrong and change 
them  accordingly?  They  do,  but  the  reception,  processing,  and  implementation  of  the 
feedback is imperfect. 9 
 
The limited effect of feedback 
TAB. 2 reports the answers a typical participant gave to the sequence Chicken-Oval-Left, 
whose correct answer is Elderly. 
 
Table 2 – Response to Chicken-Oval-Left by one Participant 
 
Turn  Answer given  Score 
12  NA  0 
26  Elderly*  6 
56  Elderly*  6 
60  Elderly*  6 
109  Adolescents  -1 
122  Adolescents  -1 
135  Adults  4 
144  Adults  4 
171  Elderly*  6 
181  Adults  4 
199  Adults  4 
209  Adults  4 
* correct answer 
 
  On turn 12, the participant skips the answer, she observes feedback and on turn 26 
he or she responds correctly. Also, she probably does so with some reason  and not at 
random, provided that she repeats the correct answer on turns 56, and 60. One would then 
imagine that this participant grasped the criterion and is going to consistently give the 
correct answer from then on. Wrong. On turn 109, the participant switched to a mistaken 
response,  and  then  repeats  it  on  turn  122.  Her  theory  was  probably  undergoing  some 
revisions. But the feedback warned her against that response. Indeed, she abandons the 
mistake and… makes a different one! Although this mistake is less severe score-wise, she 
repeats it a few turns later and, after a single correct response on turn 171, from turn 181 
until the end of the game she keeps repeating the mistake. 
  For  the  sequence  under  investigation,  this  participant  incurs  in  a  total  of  eight 
mistakes  (including  the  missing  answer  on  turn  12).  Seven  of  these  mistakes  could  be 
repeated (on turn 209 the mistake cannot be repetad because it‟s the last turn with this 
sequence).  We  consider  repeated  an  error  if  the  same  wrong  answer  is  given  in  two 
following appearance of the given sequence. This player repeats four times the same error . 
We can compute a mistake confirmation rate for this sequence (four on seven, that is 57%) 
and a mean overall value, for a given player during all the game. The mean value of this 
index for all player is 33%4. 
                                                            
4 For 20 out of  23  participants, we can reject the  hypothesis that this  happened by chance  with a 90% 
confidence. 10 
 
  The  trend  of  this  phenomenon,  moreover,  is  counterintuitive:  the  number  of 
confirmed mistakes increases, instead of decreasing: it is 27% on average in the first part of 
the experiment and 37% in the last part. It is possible to demonstrate that this results can 
hardly be the effect of random choices. Players are building theories and representation of 
this world. These theories are often based on simplification and on reduced use of available 
information, as Table 3 shows. 
 
Table 3 – Distribution of Responses, Turns 154-231 
 
 
animal  shape  shelf  elderly  adults  young  adolescent  children 
horse  circle  right  0%  4%  57%  13%  26% 
horse  circle  left  4%  10%  54%  17%  14% 
horse  oval  right  1%  9%  45%  24%  22% 
horse  oval  left  4%  7%  59%  17%  12% 
horse  square  right  2%  8%  20%  14%  55% 
horse  square  left  0%  3%  43%  38%  16% 
horse  rectangle  right  0%  3%  19%  14%  64% 
horse  rectangle  left  0%  4%  48%  35%  13% 
chicken  circle  right  17%  43%  26%  9%  4% 
chicken  circle  left  57%  20%  18%  4%  0% 
chicken  oval  right  18%  42%  28%  4%  7% 
chicken  oval  left  70%  12%  17%  0%  1% 
chicken  square  right  15%  33%  39%  7%  7% 
chicken  square  left  30%  26%  26%  9%  9% 
chicken  rectangle  right  17%  17%  48%  13%  4% 
chicken  rectangle  left  32%  17%  33%  12%  6% 
cow  circle  right  2%  7%  50%  23%  17% 
cow  circle  left  0%  22%  48%  17%  13% 
cow  oval  right  0%  13%  52%  17%  17% 
cow  oval  left  8%  8%  52%  22%  10% 
cow  square  right  0%  0%  17%  26%  57% 
cow  square  left  0%  4%  17%  65%  13% 
cow  rectangle  right  0%  4%  26%  22%  48% 
cow  rectangle  left  1%  6%  30%  52%  10% 
goose  circle  right  21%  48%  18%  12%  1% 
goose  circle  left  51%  25%  19%  6%  0% 
goose  oval  right  7%  55%  20%  14%  1% 
goose  oval  left  50%  28%  15%  7%  0% 
goose  square  right  17%  20%  48%  11%  4% 
goose  square  left  26%  30%  35%  9%  0% 
goose  rectangle  right  13%  39%  30%  9%  9% 
goose  rectangle  left  23%  22%  43%  7%  4% 
 
 
Even mistaken answers are not given at random. Participants indeed employ (imperfect, 
incomplete,  shifting)  theories  of  the  experimental  world,  so  that  even  their  mistakes 
become predictable. 
  Because of the score system, when the correct answer is Young, responding Adults 11 
 
and Adolescents is indifferent and the same happens for the answers Elderly and Children: 
both mistakes have the same distance from the correct answer and therefore results in the 
same  score.  There  should  thus  be  no  specific  reason  to  expect  that,  when  the  correct 
answer is Young, mistakes be not random. However, we observe that the mistakes are 
strongly  clustered  in  an  „almost-correct‟  direction:  when  the  Animal  is  a  Mammal,  the 
mistakes group around the two youngest membership categories, while the vice versa is 
true  for  Birds5. This tendency may be explained by the fact that at least some of the 
participants disregard the second piece of information, i.e. Shape, for at least some  of the 
sequences.  
  These  observations  serve  as  starting  point  for  the  analysis  of  the  relationship 
between entropy and performance. 
 
Performance and predictability 
It  is  our  goal  in  this  article  to  analyse  not  performance  itself,  or  best  strategies,  but 
learning
6. In order to do so we divided the game in periods. Each period has a duration of 
58 turns. The first period goes from turn 1 to turn 58, the second from turn 2 to 59, and so 
on. This way we obtain 175 periods, largely overlapping. 
  For each period, we compute: 
(i) the score of each player; and 
(ii) the behavioural entropy for each animal-shape-shelf sequence which appears at 
least 3 times. 
(i) is an indication of performance, which we could substitute e.g. with the number of 
correct answers, while (ii) measures the stability of mistaken responses. We then calculate 
an average for each participant. This way, we obtain two figures per player for each period. 
In each period, on the data of all our subjects, we can measure how these two values are 
related. The simpler measure of linear relation is the correlation coefficient which indicate 
if there is a linear relation between two variables7. FIG. 3 shows the evolution of this value. 
                                                            
5 This is especially puzzling because, in reason of the score system, the most reliable option is always Young, 
which cannot be farther than two steps from any membership category and therefore always afford positive 
score. 
6 For deeper analysis of this experimental dataset, see Lanteri and Novarese (2007). 
7 The correlation coefficient can assume all values in the range between  -1 and 1. It has negative values when 
the two variables move in different direction and therefoe a big value of one of them implies a low of the 
other. It has a value around zero when there is no linear relation among the two variables. Statistical tests are 





































































Except for a brief time at the beginning, correlations are systematically negative (in 97 out 
of  175  cases  the  values  are  significantly  different  from  0),  which  means  that  the 
participants who perform best in that part of the game also have lower entropy. This result, 
on which we shall comment further below, is not trivial. 
  The irregular trend depends in some measure on technical factors: the sequences 
appearing on each period differ. During some periods there are several sequences which 
were  clearly  understood  by  the  participants.  This,  obviously,  reduces  the  number  of 
mistakes and makes the correlation lower and less significant
8. Since the values remain 
negative despite this problem, on the other hand, the results are especially robust. This can 
also be confirmed by means of a different analysis. 
 
Table 4 – Best’s low entropy, By Period Cluster 
 
1  24 
2  35 
3  22 
4  16 
 
Table 5 – Best’s low entropy, By Period Cluster 
 
1  15 
2  31 
3  32 
4  26 
 
                                                            
8  Like  other  indexes,  ours  is  most  meaningful  when  computed  on  a  sufficiently  varied  sample.  If  all 
participants yield similar results, the index cannot unearth very meaningful relations. 13 
 
Consider now the participants who performed best in the last period and who, presumably, 
best understood the working of the experimental world. Call Best those who scored above 
the median and Worst the others. The Best have lower entropy in 159 out of 175 periods, of 
these 104 were statistically significant with the Kruskal Wallis test and were distributed 
across the clusters as in TAB. 4. Here, again, some of the periods do not yield meaningful 
results, because the Best perform so well that few mistakes in a single sequence crucially 
alter the index. 
  The  same  comparison  for  the  overall  experiment  (which  is  a  more  relevant  and 
robust index) reported in TAB. 5 reveals that the Best have an average mistake entropy of 
.23, versus .33 for the Worst (statistically significant both with the t-test and the Kruskal 
Wallis). The overall correlation between entropy and score is - .83 (significantly different 
from 0 at the 99% confidence interval). 
We can show what does this pattern represent in a very intuitive fashion, by means of TAB. 
6, which compares the behaviour of one of the Worst and one of the Best players. For each 
sequence in which the players made at least two mistakes in the period between turn 59 
and 117, we calculate the frequency distribution of responses. It is quite evident – even 
without sophisticated indexes – that the worse player tends to have more heterogeneous 
mistakes, with many wrong answers only given once. The better player, on the other hand, 
tends  to  concentrate  her  mistakes  on  few  sequences.  Not  only  the  mistakes  are  less 
numerous, but they are also more regular. The same results can be found throughout the 
experiment and for all players. In the very last turns, however, the Best players have so few 
mistakes that the comparison is meaningless. 
  Generally speaking, therefore, it seems that the capacity to give correct answers is 
associated with stable behaviour even with respect to mistakes, which is an indication of a 
tendency to apply rules even if these rules are wrong. On the other hand, the direction of 
causality is not clear, because both can in principle explain each other. Indeed, since this 
phenomenon can be observed very early in the game, but it is stronger in the central part 
of the experiment, and since it is larger for the Best group, suggests two interpretations. 
* The participants who develop the most correct rules tend to apply rules even when they 
are not correct. In this case we imagine that people employ analogical reasoning and apply 
some „default‟ or „reliable‟ rule when they lack a context-specific rule. 
* It is also plausible that the individual capacity or tendency to focus on some variables and 
the  disregard  of  other  variables  (which  produces  steady  behaviour  and  little  entropy) 
facilitates the understanding of the solution and consequently results in a higher score. 
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Table 6 – Players’ Comparison 
 
      Worst  Best 
      Child.  Adol.  You.  Ad.  Eld.  TOT.  Child.  Adol.  You.  Ad.  Eld.  TOT. 
Cow  Square  Right  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  1  -  -  2 
  Rectangle  Right  -  1  -  1  1  3  -  -  -  -  -  - 
    Left  -  -  1  -  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  Circle  Right  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  2  -  -  -  3 
    Left  1  1  -  -  -  2  -  2  -  -  -  2 
  Oval  Left  -  1  -  2  1  4  -  2  -  -  -  2 
Horse  Square  Right  -  -  2  -  -  2  -  2  -  -  -  2 
  Circle  Left  -  1  -  3  -  4  -  5  -  -  -  5 
  Oval  Right  -  2  -  -  -  2  -  1  -  3  -  4 
    Left  -  1  -  1  -  2  -  2  -  -  -  2 
Chicken  Circle  Left  -  1  1  -  -  2  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  Oval  Right  -  2  -  -  -  2  -  -  -  -  -  - 
    Left  -  1  -  1  -  2  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Goose  Square  Right  -  1  -  -  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  Rectangle  Left  -  1  -  -  1  2  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  Circle  Right  1  -  -  -  2  3  -  -  3  -  -  3 
    Left  1  -  -  1  -  2  -  -  2  -  -  2 
  Oval  Right  -  -  1  -  1  2  -  -  3  -  -  3 




  It is not straightforward to understand whether the repetition of mistakes is caused 
by or is responsible for the high score. The observation that the participants who perform 
best at the end of (but not necessarily throughout) the experiment also have low entropy all 
along the game (and even at the beginning) suggests that it is the low entropy that favours 
a superior understanding of the experimental world. A deeper understanding of this issue 
is central to uncovering actual learning processes. Moreover, it may prove an important 
element towards defining better training and teaching techniques. 
  We may test this idea as follows. Consider the correlation between entropy in a 
period and score in an earlier period (e.g. 25 periods earlier). If low entropy is responsible 
for high score, which would mean that participants employ whatever rules they have learnt 
when lacking a better rule, this time-lagged correlation will be stronger than the normal 
correlation. Before they may apply a rule, participants ought to develop and work it out. 
Therefore a low observed entropy in a given turn should be a consequence of the correct 
answers given earlier in the experiment. In other words, under this hypothesis, if people do 
export  to  similar  contexts  the  rules  they  have  learnt  in  some  decision  contexts,  there 
should be a slight delay in the correlation between high score and low entropy. 
  To study this phenomenon, we investigate to what extent does entropy in a given 
period depends on the score of the same period and how much does it depend on that of an 
earlier period. We confine the most technical parts of our analysis to the Appendix for the 
readers willing to dig deeper in the matter. Suffice it to say here that the correlation is 
highest between entropy and current score than with score of periods which started 12, 25, 
or 35 turns earlier. In fact, the effect of time-lagged score is opposite to what we expect: 
those  who  scored  the  most  in  previous  turns  have  higher  entropy.  One  plausible 
explanation for this pattern is that the participants who have found some simple strategies 
to  respond,  then  try  to  elaborate  on  those  by  means  of  trial-and-error,  therefore  their 
behaviour is less stable (see also Lanteri and Novarese 2007). 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The conclusions above, though perhaps not final, reinforce the two-headed interpretation. 
If the lower entropy of the best performing players depended on the application of past 
rules in the present, the effect of time-lagged score should be stronger. The fact that it is 
weaker suggests instead that best players tend to generalise rules, therefore reducing the 
information complexity of the environment. The tendency to generalize is common to all  
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participants, but a decision context like that of our experiment certainly favours those for 
which the tendency is strongest. 
  The two procedures: <export rules beyond their context> (or analogical decision-
making or learning spillover) and <reduce the amount of information employed> are not 
mutually  exclusive.  It  is  nonetheless  better  to  keep  them  separated  because  they  are 
conceptually distinct and both may prove either useful or dangerous. 
  Analogical problem-solving, on the other hand, amounts to a selective use of the 
information because it amounts to treating as identical or similar, two situations which 
differ in a number of respects. It is natural way of reasoning (Novarese, 2012), but also a 
strategy suggested by George Polya in How to Solve It, which can be described as perfectly 
rational. „Do you know a related problem?‟ is one of the first questions the Polya lists in his 
strategy to solve any problem, elaborating on a method derived from mathematical theory. 
The first step to devise a plan is to “ask these questions: „Have you seen it before? Or have 
you seen the same problem in a slightly different form?‟” (p. xvi). 
  On  the  other  hand,  the  reduction  of  employed  variables  is  part  and  parcel  of 
theorisation: it is the very core of ceteris paribus. In order to investigate the effect of one 
variable, every other variable is excluded from the analysis by being held (or assumed) 
constant. Our best chances at understanding the effect of a variable is to investigate it in 
isolation. 
  More generally we may advance the following suggestion. Though we may not yet 
say for what specific reason, a high score is associated with low entropy for mistakes and 
therefore  with  a  tendency  to  repeat  mistakes  over  and  over.  Though  the  repetition  of 
mistakes  might  be  considered  a  failure  to  properly  employ  feedback  or  a  bias,  it  may 
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Appendix A - Instructions 
 
In what follows we report the instructions of the game you will take part in. You will be 
compensated with real money (40 ITL per point). 
 
The Game 
An  association  has  different  membership  categories  which  pay  different  fees  and  have 







Children and adolescents do not pay. Young pay a reduced fee. Adults and Elderly pay the 
full fee. Members‟ information are recorded on a set of cards, stored on different shelves.  
 
Each card is characterized by: 
- the drawing of an animal 
- the drawing of a shape 
- a shelf 
(e.g. A card might have the drawing of a cow and a square, and be placed on the 
right shelf.) 
 
You do not know the classification system and thus which cards corresponds to which 
category. The goal of the game is to understand this correspondence. 
 
The game lasts 231 turns. In each turn you will be shown the information from one card, so 






Based on this information you shall indicate the correct membership category, keeping in 
mind that: 
- there is a logical relationship between the information and membership categories 
- the relationship is constant throughout the game 
- the relationship is completely artificial (therefore it is neither necessary nor useful 
to have experience of actual filing systems or any other specialised knowledge) 
 
Obviously, the earliest answers will be given at random. 
 
Each turn, therefore, the game will take place in the following way: 
1- You see the information; 
2- You give your answer (note: you must choose within 10 seconds, after this time 
the system proceeds to the next turn); 
3- You are told the correct answer and your score in the last turn. 
4- You move on to the next turn and you start again. 
During the game you are not allowed to talk, nor to take notes 
 
The Score 
In order to calculate the score we define the distance between the answer you gave and the 
correct answer, as follows: 
- if the answer is correct, the distance is 0 and you score +6; 
- if the answer given is children and the correct answer is elderly (or vice versa), the 
distance is highest: 4 and you score -4; 
- if the answer given is children and the correct answer is adult (or vice versa), or if 
the answer given is adolescents and the correct answer is elderly (or vice versa), the 
distance is 3 and you score -1; 
- if the answer given is children and the correct answer is young (or vice versa), if 
the answer given is adolescent and the correct answer is adult (or vice versa), or if 
the  answer  given  is  young  and  the  correct  answer  is  elderly  (or  vice  versa),  the 
distance is 2 and you score +1; 
- if the answer given is children and the correct answer is adolescents (or vice versa), 
if the answer given is adolescent and the correct answer is young (or vice versa), if 
the answer given is young and the correct answer is adults (or vice versa), or if the  
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answer given is adults and the correct answer is elderly (or vice versa), the distance 
is 1 and you score +4; 
- if you do not answer, you score 0. 
 
Game dynamics 
Each turn of the game can be divided into two parts. 
The first part requires that you choose one of the five alternatives offered, by means of 
selecting the corresponding button and then “Enter”. 
It is important that you complete these operations within 10 seconds because, when such 
time  has  elapsed,  the  system  moves  on  with  the  test  and  it  records  “No  Answer” 
corresponding to zero points. 
 
After you made your choice, or after 10 seconds, you move on to the second part of the 
turn. 
The screen will report the outcome of the present turn. It reminds you the choice you 
made,  the  correct  answer,  and  your  score  for  this  turn.  The  window  stays  open  for  6 
seconds, after which the system starts the next turn.  
22 
 
Appendix B - Time-lagged Score and Entropy 
 
FIG. 4 compares the correlations (after period 26). The values do not differ too  much. 
Generally  speaking,  the  correlation  between  entropy  and  time-lagged  score  has  values 
closer to 0 and these values are less significant than the correlation between entropy and 
simultaneous score (79 vs. 91 values are significantly different from 0). 
  To assess more precisely the influence of simultaneous  score compared with the 
time-lagged  one,  we  shall  employ  a  linear  regression  analysis,  in  which  entropy  is  the 
dependent variable. The two scores are used as independent variables so to measure their 





Table 7 – Score and Entropy (Time-lag 25) 
 
      TIME-LAG SCORE 25   
      not significant  significant  Tot. 
      -  +  -  +   
SCORE 
not significant  -  56  47      103 
  +  21    1    22 
significant  -  1  16    8  25 
  +  0  0  0  0  0 
  Tot.    78  63  1  8  150 
 
In most periods the correlation is not significant. It is sometimes significant, but neither 
independent  variable  is  individually  significant  (this  is  also  because  of  the  correlation 
between time-lagged and simultaneous score). The sign of the variables SCORE and TIME-
LAG SCORE are nonetheless noteworthy. TAB. 7 does this and it also distinguishes the 
cases in which the two independent variables are significant at the 90% level. The SCORE  
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variable is negative in 128 cases out of 150 and it is significant in 25 of these. The TIME-
LAG SCORE variable is significantly different from 0 in just 9 cases, in 8 of which it has 
positive sign. Out of 150 repetitions, it is positive 71 times. 
  We can thus make some inferences. 
* The effect of simultaneous score is stronger and it is negative. 
* The effect of time-lagged score is less strong. Perhaps during some periods it reinforces 
the other effect, but with an opposite sign: for a given score in a period, a higher the time-
lagged score is associated with higher entropy for mistaken answers. During such periods, 
the players who previously performed better have higher entropy, possibly because they 
are  confident  with  some  portions  of  the  solution  and  are  more  inclined  to  try  and 
understand the remaining portions. 
 
Table 8 – Score and Entropy (Time-lag 12) 
 
      TIME-LAG SCORE 12   
      not significant  significant   
      -  +  -  +   
SCORE 
not significant  -  63  50      113 
  +  32    2    34 
significant  -    6    10  16 
  +          0 
  Tot.    95  56  2  10  163 
 
Table 9 – Score and Entropy (Time-lag 35) 
 
      TIME-LAG SCORE 35   
      not significant  significant   
      -  +  -  +   
SCORE 
not significant  -  54  41      95 
  +  15    1    16 
significant  -  1  23    5  29 
  +           
  Tot.    70  64  1  5  140 
 
The time-lag we use is obviously arbitrary, but we employ two more time-lags, 12 and 35 
periods, to test the robustness of our inferences. In this former case (TAB. 8), there are 
fewer significant cases, but the other conclusions hold. In the latter case (TAB. 9), despite a 
smaller number of estimates (because we ought to skip the first 35 turns), the significant  
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cases  grow.  The  interpretation  does  not  change  and  TIME-LAG  SCORE  is  ever  less 
significant and with a positive sign. 
  The larger the time-lag, therefore, the less significant is time-lagged score (and with 
a positive sign), but the more significant the simultaneous score (and with a negative sign) 
also  because  the  correlation  between  the  two  is  reduced  and  the  estimates  are  more 
reliable.  
 